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Abstract 
In this paper we use the 1995 Kobe earthquake as a natural experiment to examine the impact of 
a large exogenous physical shock on local economic activity.  For the first time we are able to 
control for local spatial heterogeneity in the damage caused by a natural disaster using geo-coded 
plant location and unique building-level surveys.  In a survival analysis of manufacturing plants 
our results show that building-level damage significantly affects a plant’s likelihood of failure and 
this effect persists for up to seven years.  Further analysis demonstrates that the plants most 
likely to exit as a result of earthquake damage are the least productive which is suggestive of a 
cleansing effect as the average productivity rate of the remaining plants increases.  We also find 
that continuing plants experience a temporary increase in productivity following the earthquake 
consistent with a “build back better” effect.  In terms of local regeneration our results indicate 
that plant births increase in areas with more severe damage consistent with redevelopment plans 
for Kobe. 
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1. Introduction 
Earthquakes, like all natural disasters, can have a devastating impact on infrastructure, 
households, and firms in the affected areas.  While humanitarian support is the immediate 
priority, in the medium to long term it is important for policymakers to understand how natural 
disasters impact local economic activity so they can provide the most effective support to 
affected communities. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the 1995 Kobe earthquake on local 
economic activity.  The 1995 Kobe earthquake was one of the most severe in modern history, 
with a magnitude of 7.2 on the Richter scale and estimated to have caused $100 billion in damage 
(approximately 2.5% of Japan’s GDP at the time).1  The first contribution of this paper is to 
demonstrate the importance of capturing the spatial heterogeneity in damage that can result from 
a natural disaster.  More specifically, we use building level surveys from the Japanese and Kobe 
City governments to measure the damage caused by the earthquake to individual buildings.  The 
creation of this unique dataset enables us to capture the degree of heterogeneity in damage levels 
which can leave a building undamaged while totally destroying neighboring buildings.  Our 
second contribution is to combine our unique building-level damage variable with a 16 year 
exhaustive panel of plants both before and after the earthquake to examine the impact of the 
earthquake on the birth, life and death of plants with an emphasis on plant-level productivity.  
Specifically, we answer four related questions.  First, do building level damages have a prolonged 
effect on the probability of plant survival and, second, is there evidence of a cleansing effect 
associated with natural disasters whereby the least productive firms are most likely to exit?  
Third, do surviving firms increase their productivity consistent with a “build back better” effect? 
Finally, is the location of plant births affected by the extent of the damage to a local area? 
The premise that natural disasters may have a cleansing effect has its origin in a number of 
theoretical studies, such as Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Ouyang (2009) who have 
suggested that it is the least productive and the youngest firms which fail as a result of a 
recession.  To date the empirical evidence on how cost shocks induced by recessions may hasten 
the demise of unproductive firms has been rather mixed (see, for example, Barlevy 2002).  In this 
regard, our study can be viewed as a natural experiment where a large number of firms are 
subject to a substantial exogenous shock (with both supply side and demand side implications) 
1 Although officially known as the Hanshin-Awaji Great Earthquake it is also known as the Hanshin or Kobe 
earthquake.  In this paper we follow Horwich (2000) and refer to it as the Kobe earthquake.   
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that was unrelated to their productivity prior to the event.2  The Kobe event therefore provides 
an ideal setting to examine the short and medium term effects of a negative shock at the local 
level.  Importantly for our study, Kobe is an area of Japan which was believed to be relatively 
safe from earthquakes and hence little preparation and anticipatory behaviour took place prior to 
the earthquake.  From an empirical perspective it can therefore be considered a truly exogenous 
shock.3 
A brief review of the existing literature shows that a common trait in many studies is the use of 
aggregated data whether it is across sectors, space or disaster-type.  The majority of studies tend 
to take a cross-country macroeconomic approach to determine the impact of a disaster on 
country level growth (e.g. Loayza et al. 2012, Noy 2009, Strobl 2012 and Ahlerup 2013).  The 
results from these studies have been rather mixed.  On the one hand, because natural disasters 
are often associated with significant physical damage and human suffering the impact should be 
“naturally negative” (Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2014).  On the other hand, fiscal expenditure and 
foreign aid can stimulate locally affected areas and result in an overall positive effect driven by a 
disaster response that may result in more effective infrastructure or an increased productive 
effort in unaffected areas (Albala-Bertrand 1993).  Likewise, when more capital is destroyed than 
labor, the return to capital can increase which can also result in short-term growth.  Local 
workers may also be incentivised to work harder to compensate for inter-temporal losses 
(Melecky and Raddatz 2011).4 
Other research has raised concerns about the aggregation effect.  Loayza et al. (2012) for 
example, show that the type and magnitude of a natural disaster can determine the sign and size 
of the estimated effect.  Using satellite derived nightlight data, Bertinelli and Strobl (2013), Strobl 
(2011) and Elliott et al. (2015) show that for hurricanes and typhoons, national level regressions 
can mask much of the impact at the local regional level.  Similarly, Fisker (2012) using an 
2 The earthquake can be thought of as a traditional cost shock (the cost of rebuilding the plant and/or replacing 
workers who may have been killed or migrated from Kobe) or a demand and supply shock.  On the demand side, 
disruption to customers as a result of the earthquake may mean delays to the purchase of intermediates.  On the 
supply side, plant production may be delayed whilst repairs are undertaken which, for a given plant, may lead to a 
loss of market share to undamaged competitors elsewhere in Kobe or further afield both within Japan and 
internationally. 
3 The unanticipated nature of the shock is emphasised by Kaji Hideki (UNRCD Director) who stated that “During 
the 1,500 years that earthquake occurrence has been recorded in Japan, not once has Kobe been directly hit by an earthquake and it has 
always had the image of being a city safe from earthquakes”.  The unexpected nature of the earthquake is emphasised by 
Ederington (2011) who, when discussing the lack of insurance states that “Few businesses or private households held 
earthquake insurance.  Indeed, most losses were uninsured: only 3% of property in the Kobe area was covered by earthquake indemnity”. 
4 The absence of a consensus on the average effects of natural disasters is illustrated by Cuaresma et al. (2008) and 
Cavallo and Noy (2011) who argue that on average natural disasters have a positive and negative impact, 
respectively.  In a related literature, Davis and Weinstein (2002) and Brakman et al. (2004) examine the effect of 
allied bombing during the second world-war on city size in Japan and Germany, respectively.  They find the effects 
of such bombing to be short term with long run city size unaffected. 
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earthquake intensity measure finds that although there were no observable country-level effects, 
an earthquake does have a significant negative impact at the local level.  This may be particularly 
important for earthquakes as their local impacts tend to differ even within relatively small 
geographical areas in that the extent of damage to a location depends on the magnitude, depth, 
and distance to the epicentre but also on local geological conditions, that can differ across just 
meters, and the architecture of buildings.5  Finally, and perhaps most importantly for our paper, 
one of the main impediments to accurately measuring the impact of a natural disaster has been 
the lack of a precise proxy for damage.  That is, studies have almost exclusively resorted to using 
(possibly systematic) measurement error prone post-disaster cost estimates (most of the macro-
economic studies have relied on the EMDAT database which collects information on losses due 
to natural disasters at the country level from publicly available sources) or, more recently, 
potential destruction proxies derived from physical characteristics of the event.6 
A handful of other papers use firm or plant-level data to examine the impact of natural disasters.  
For example, Craioveanu and Terrell (2016) consider the impact of storms on firm survival using 
elevation above sea level as a measure of flood damage during Hurricane Katrina and find that 
large firms and those with less damage are more likely to survive.  Other studies of Hurricane 
Katrina use geo-coded categorization of wind and flood damage information to capture 
heterogeneity in the damage (see e.g. Jarmin and Miranda 2009 and Groen et al. 2016).  Paxson 
and Rouse (2008) for example use the variation in standing water in residences to predict return 
migration of refugees to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.  De Mel et al. (2012) conduct a 
post-disaster field study of surviving enterprises and workers following the Sri Lanka tsunami 
and find that aid helps retailers, but not manufacturing firms, to recover.  Hosono et al. (2012) 
investigate the effect of banks’ lending capacity on firms’ capital investment using the Kobe 
earthquake as an exogenous shock but measure damage only broadly in terms of affected areas.  
Finally, Tanaka (2015) examines the short-term economic impact of the Kobe earthquake but 
does so by assuming that all plants within Kobe suffered the same damage.  He finds that the 
earthquake had a significant short term impact on employment and value added. 
Other studies of the Kobe event include duPont et al. (2015) and duPont and Noy (2015).  The 
first paper estimates the long term socio-economic impact of the earthquake using city and town 
5  The heterogeneous nature of earthquake damage relates to the presence of possible landslides, fires, soil 
liquefaction, floods and tsunamis.  Two important geological factors are the softness of the ground and the total 
thickness of the sediment which can vary widely even within several meters of an area. 
6 Other studies that attempt to capture the impact of a natural disaster include Okazaki et al. (2011) who use broad 
geographical damage indicators to examine the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake and Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014) 
who build a database of disaster events and intensities from primary geophysical and meteorological information. 
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data using a synthetic control method to create a counter-factual.  The results suggest a 
permanent negative average income effect for areas close to the epicentre but also some 
evidence of a positive impact in the surrounding areas.  The second paper also uses synthetic 
control methods (following Abadie et al. 2010) to measure the long term impact of the Kobe 
earthquake and suggests that the true cost of the earthquake was twice as high as previous 
estimates.7  
Our contribution to the literature is to capture the degree of damage to the buildings of 
individual plants and then to assess how damage levels affect the birth, life and death of plants.  
Our methodological approach is to begin with a simple productivity decomposition approach 
(Foster et al. 2006) to help understand how the Kobe earthquake may have acted as a driver of 
productivity change.  Next we employ a proportional hazards modelling approach (Cox 1972) to 
estimate the impact of building-level damage on plant survival.8  For the surviving firms we then 
estimate a simple panel fixed effects model of the determinants of productivity.  Finally, we 
estimate a negative binomial model to investigate the determinants of plant birth location taking 
into account measures of damage to local georgraphical areas. 
To briefly highlight our results, our decomposition analysis shows that improvements in 
productivity over our sample period are driven predominantly by the entry of new plants after 
the earthquake.  In terms of plants that existed prior to the earthquake we find that, as we might 
expect, plants that experienced building damage were less likely to survive than those residing in 
less damaged buildings but, more surprisingly, we find that the reduced probability of survival 
lasts for up to seven years after the earthquake.  This suggests that plants can continue to suffer 
from the negative effects of a natural disaster for much longer than the conventional 
macroeconomic evidence suggests.  We also find that the risk of exit as a result of earthquake 
damage is highest for those plants that are the least productive which is supportive of a cleansing 
effect from large cost shocks.  In terms of plant performance, our panel fixed-effects results 
show a positive effect of building-damage on post-quake labor productivity albeit with a fairly 
rapid decline over time which is indicative of a narrative where surviving plants “build back 
better”.  Finally, for plant births, our results suggest that low to moderate levels of earthquake 
7 Other studies that examine different aspects of the Kobe earthquake include Sawada and Shimizutani (2008) and 
Fujiki and Hsiao (2013).  There have also been a small number of case studies examining US disasters such as 
Dorfman et al. (2007) who look at the employment and wage effects of Hurricane Katrina.   A second strand of the 
literature examines the impact of earthquakes on the housing market following an earthquake (Beron et al. 1997 
looking at the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake and Deng et al. 2013 looking at the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake). 
8 There is a large literature examining different aspects of firm survival.  For example, Agarwal and Gort (2002) 
study firm survival in the context of a product life cycle framework while Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) use a 
hazard function to examine new firm survival rates. 
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damage, in relatively small geographical areas, generally deter such births, while more severe 
damage appears to have acted as a positive stimulus for new plant creation.  Reconstruction and 
government support is the most likely explanation for these results. 
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 presents the background to the 
Kobe earthquake.  Section 3 describes our data.  Section 4 presents our decomposition 
methodology and results.  Sections 5, 6 and 7 we present our analysis of plant exit, plants that 
continue and plants that enter Kobe after the earthquake.  Section 8 concludes. 
2. The Kobe Earthquake 
The 1995 Kobe earthquake occurred at a time when the Japanese economy was in a period of 
stagnation following the economic boom of the 1980s.  During the 1990s and 2000s the 
Japanese economy grew very little and due to a historic reliance on traditional industries such as 
steel and shipbuilding the city of Kobe faced considerable challenges.  This also meant that the 
local Kobe government had to incur considerable debt to pay for the city’s reconstruction.  
Johnston (2005) points out that by the end of 2005 the City of Kobe had more than 3 trillion 
Yen in municipal bonds outstanding and was effectively bankrupt.  Since firms also took on 
considerable borrowings following the earthquake they too came under financial pressure due to 
the relative slow growth of the Japanese economy.  Hence, the effects of natural disasters can be 
prolonged and affect the chances of plant survival long after the event itself as the accumulated 
debt incurred to help the rebuilding process means that plants become less competitive relative 
to their undamaged and non-indebted competitors.9 
The earthquake that shook the Hanshin region of Western Japan that includes the city of Kobe 
struck on the 17th January 1995 at 5.46am and lasted for a little under one minute with a 
strength of 7.2 on the Richter scale.  Kobe is located 430 km southwest of Tokyo and at the time 
was an important port city with a population of close to 1.5 million contributing around 10% of 
Japan’s total GDP (Orr 2007).  The epicentre of the earthquake was 25km from central Kobe 
and was the first major earthquake to strike a Japanese urban area since the end of World War II.  
As a port city Kobe was home to a large number of working class and immigrant communities as 
well as a middle class involved in the shipping and industrial sectors.  As an older city Kobe also 
9 This section draws in part on Edgington (2011), who examines the reconstruction of Kobe and the geography of 
the crisis, and a report from UNRCD (1995) entitled the “Comprehensive Study of the Great Hanshin Earthquake”. 
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had a very high population density with between 6,000 and 12,000 people per square kilometre 
(Orr 2007).10 
The massive scale of the destruction was caused by two key factors in addition to the magnitude, 
depth and timing of the earthquake.  First, the soil in many areas of the city was soft and water 
saturated which led to landslides and structural damage as a result of liquefaction.  This meant 
that damage was concentrated in a narrow area of soft soil 30km long and just 2km wide (Orr 
2007).  Second, Kobe itself is located on a narrow strip of land between the Rokko mountains 
and Osaka Bay which meant that city lifelines were easily cut not least because they were almost 
all installed prior to more recent building codes.  Hence, immense damage was caused to 
infrastructure including the expressway and numerous high-rise buildings.  In addition, tunnels 
and bridges were destroyed and train tracks buckled. 
One consequence of the earthquake was the wholesale destruction of houses and commercial 
premises with large parts of the city affected by fires.  Firestorms were a particular problem in 
the narrow streets of the older districts where the traditional wooden houses were still prevalent 
and tended to be populated by Kobe’s older residents and students.  The middle classes tended 
to live outside of the centre in higher quality and newer homes (Shaw and Goda 2004). 
According to the City of Kobe (2012), 4,571 people lost their lives in Kobe city with a further 
14,687 injured.  A notable 59% of those who died were over the age of 60, the majority of whom 
died due to crushing related injuries.  The damage to buildings was considerable.  The number of 
fully collapsed buildings was 67,421 and partially collapsed 55,145.  Fire damage caused the 
complete destruction of 6,965 structures with many others being partially burned (covering a 
total area of 819,108 m2).  Utilities were also severely impacted.  In addition to city-wide power 
and industrial water failure, 25% of phone lines were down and 80% of gas supplies no longer 
operated.  The total value of the damage was estimated to be around 6.9 trillion Yen (0.0681 
trillion dollars in 2016 prices). 
In terms of industry, according to the City of Kobe (2012) report, many large manufacturers 
suffered damage to their main factories and had production lines interrupted.  For small and 
medium sized enterprises the damage was extensive.  Approximately 80% of factories in the 
non-leather shoe industry were damaged and 50% of the Sake breweries were severely impacted.  
The tourism, agriculture and fishing sectors were also badly affected.  The manufacturing 
production indices in September 2007 for non-leather shoes and Sake Breweries were only 
10 The housing in the older areas of Kobe tended to be constructed using heavy roof tiles and light frames and were 
designed to withstand storms but were not well suited for earthquakes (Orr, 2007). 
7 
 
                                                          
78.8% and 40.4% of the September 1994 figures respectively suggesting a significant de-
agglomeration effect (see e.g. Maejima 1995).  Further difficulties were caused by the collapse of 
the Hyogo Bank in Kobe following bankruptcies from the bank’s borrowers (individual and 
corporate) which in turn lead to a fall in local land prices which exacerbated problems of bad 
loans from other borrowers (Edgington 2011). 
The one mitigating factor that helped the larger companies was their membership of wider 
conglomerates (Keiretsu) which had access to funds to enable rapid recovery.  Examples include 
Kobe Steel, Kawasaki Steel and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.  However, small and medium sized 
enterprises were less fortunate.  Edgington (2010) cites a Kobe Chamber of Commerce survey 
that found that for the first one or two years following the earthquake, large numbers of 
businesses and retailers were operating out of tents and prefabricated buildings with many others 
suffering continued financial problems that often resulted in the closure of the business (HERO 
1998).  Moreover, small and medium sized firms found it difficult to benefit directly from the 
large construction projects that were often lead by Tokyo headquartered corporate companies.  
According to Saito (2005) the most affected firms were those that were reliant on local demand 
and those that faced low cost competition from China. 
Finally, in terms of reconstruction efforts, given the heterogeneous nature of the reconstruction 
expenditure both politically and geographically it is important to have an understanding of the 
decision making process.  Although considerable effort was targeted at house building, 
neighborhood community reconstruction projects and health care, in this paper we are primarily 
concerned with economic revitalization.  The main objectives according to the City of Kobe 
(2012) were to secure job opportunities through early recovery, to promote local industries that 
were perceived to be central to urban restoration, to create new businesses and to encourage 
growth industries to move to Kobe which would result in a more sophisticated industrial 
structure (build back better).  Much of this work came under the Hansin-Awaji Economic 
Revitalization Organization which operated between December 1995 and March 2005.  One 
specific policy that we are able to capture is where Kobe city nominated a number of areas (for 
three years) that were severely damaged in the quake but were perceived as being in strategically 
important areas of the city (Kobe City Office report “The emergency development regulation for 
earthquake disaster reconstruction”). 
Emergency measures provided by the government to firms included an emergency loan system 
(ended 31st July 1995) which provided 94.9 billion Yen in loans in 5,979 cases and a further 23.2 
billion Yen in 4,129 cases for unsecured loans.  Between 1998 and 2005 it was also possible to 
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receive targeted loans and business guidance on how to re-open a business in Kobe.  Other 
initiatives included a rental assistance scheme to operate in private factories and interest subsidies 
for small and medium sized businesses that wanted to invest in new equipment.  Finally, to help 
attract new industries and international trade, the Kobe Enterprise Zone was approved in 
January 1997 which had attracted 374 firms by 2006.11 
However, as Horwich (2000) points out, whilst the non-interest loans and subsidies for factory 
construction certainly helped, not all firms could get access to these funds leading to further 
bankruptcies.  Whilst these loans were welcomed by business, and in many cases enabled the 
business to continue trading, the resultant increased debt burden was said to lead to many 
bankruptcies over the following 10 years (Edgington 2011).  
To put the local economic impact of the earthquake in context we now turn briefly to the 
economy of Japan.  During the 1990s Japan was in a period of stagnation following the boom of 
the late 1980s.  The country experienced relatively low growth up until 2004/2005 when the 
recovery picked up.  In Kobe the damage from the earthquake coupled with an industrial 
structure that relied on the traditional heavy industries of shipbuilding and steel, meant that 
recovery in certain sectors was challenging.  This also meant that the City of Kobe had to incur 
considerable debt to continue to pay for the city’s reconstruction.  Johnston (2005) points out 
that by the end of 2005 the City of Kobe had more than 3 trillion Yen in municipal bonds 
outstanding and was effectively bankrupt.  Since firms also took on considerable borrowings 
following the earthquake they too came under financial pressure due to the relative slow growth 
of the Japanese economy.   
Overall, it can be argued that the Kobe earthquake had a substantial long-term impact on Kobe.  
Figure 1 provides manufacturing output in Kobe and for the rest of Japan, each expressed 
relative to 1993 pre-earthquake output. As can be seen, manufacturing output in Kobe remains 
below pre-earthquake levels throughout our sample period, with 2007 output being only 89.2% 
of pre-earthquake levels. Similarly, the Nikkei Weekly (2005) reported in 2005 that 69% of small 
firms claimed that their profits had not returned to pre-quake levels. However, these trends are 
not seen at the national level.  As Figure 1 illustrates, national manufacturing output in the rest of 
Japan exceeded pre-quake levels as early as 1996. Throughout our sample period the rest of 
Japan fared better, relative to the immediate pre-quake period, than Kobe. 
11 In a related development the Port of Kobe had largely been redeveloped by the end of March 1997.  However, 
the number of containers handled by the Port of Kobe in 2007 was still only 84.8% of the 1994 figure, although the 
total value of imports in 2007 was 106.4% of the 1994 value and exports were 95.3% of the 1994 value. 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
3. Data 
3.1 Panel Data of Manufacturing Plants 
We utilise the Japanese Manufacturing Census (Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry) and the Establishment and Enterprise Census (Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications) to create a database of manufacturing plants in Kobe city from 1992.  Our 
sample contains 4349 plants in 1992, falling to 2134 in 2007. Note that data for 1994 are missing 
from our dataset as the earthquake prevented data collection. This year is therefore omitted, 
through necessity, from our analysis. Importantly, the Manufacturing Census and the 
Establishment and Enterprise Census are exhaustive and do not have a minimum size 
requirement for inclusion.  As such, we do not have the problem of plants leaving the sample 
simply because their size has dropped below a minimum threshold.  We are therefore able to 
identify precisely when a plant closed down in Kobe.  One caveat is that although we know 
when a plant closes and reopens elsewhere in Kobe, we cannot distinguish between those plants 
that closed permanently and those that moved elsewhere within Japan.  However, since the focus 
of this paper is on the local impact of the Kobe earthquake, this distinction is not crucial.  
Whether a plant exits or relocates, its activities within Kobe have ceased.  In terms of 
characteristics of the plants, the census provides, amongst other things, information on the exact 
address, sector of activity, age, average wages, employment, and value added.12 
3.2 Earthquake Damage Data 
3.2.1 Plant-Level Damage 
To accurately identify the level of damage suffered by each plant we utilise the ‘Shinsai Hukkou 
Akaibu’ (archive on the damage of the 1995 Hyogo-Awaji earthquake) by Kobe City Office and 
Toru Fukushima (University of Hyogo), together with ‘Zenrin’s Residential Map, Hyogo-ken 
Kobe city 1995’ from Toru Fukushima (University of Hyogo).  These sources provide a highly 
detailed map of Kobe and assign one of five colors to each building to categorise damage.  
Shortly after the earthquake each registered building (registered prior to the earthquake) was 
12 In Japan an address usually consists of seven elements starting with a prefecture (ken) which is the largest division 
of the country.  Next comes the municipality or city (shi).  Each city consists of a number of wards (ku) which may 
be further divided into machi or cho.  Below this are the detailed address information which is the city district (chome) 
followed by the city block (banchi) and finally the building number (go). 
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surveyed to measure the damage incurred and then used to classify the building into one of five 
categories: 
1. Green: No damage (damage was not more than 3 per cent of the building’s total value). 
2. Yellow: Partially collapsed (damage between 3-20% of the building’s value). 
3. Orange: Half collapsed (damage between 20-50% of the building’s total value; typically 
partial damage to the principal structures such as walls, pillars, beams, roof and stairs). 
4. Red: Fully collapsed (damage between 50-100% of the building’s total value; typically 
damage to the principal structures such as walls, pillars, beams, roof and stairs). 
5. Pink: Fire damage (damage between 50-100% of the building’s total value). 
The original maps consist of 111 individual tiles in jpeg format covering the Kobe area.  These 
were then geo-referenced and the buildings and their corresponding colors extracted and cleaned 
to generate a set of building polygons with their damage colors.  Figure A in the online appendix 
presents an example of part of the original tiles.  Using the address of each plant we are able to 
identify the plant’s location by its latitude and longitude which enables us to assign each plant to 
an exact building which is then classified in to one of the five categories listed above. 
As a starting point we create a single variable damage index, PlantDAM, which is a proxy for the 
percentage of loss in value of the building in which a plant was residing.  More specifically, we 
assign a numerical scale to each building color type by using the median between the category 
thresholds (i.e. 11.5% loss of value for yellow, 35% for orange, and 75% for red), except for 
green buildings which we assigned a loss of value of 0%.  As part of our robustness checks we 
experiment with other values for each category.13 
 
3.2.2 Chome-Level Damage 
From the original map the local authorities also created summary measures of damages at the 
local chome-level, where a chome is a small administrative unit (city district) of which there are 
3,179 in the Kobe-Hanshin area.14  Since we have a proxy for building-level damage it means that 
13 One could also use the individual categories on their own and create a set of corresponding dummy variables.  We 
opt for the ratio variable as our benchmark proxy for a number of reasons.  First, as will be seen, we include time 
interactions in our analysis, making the interpretation of a single index more amenable to both presentation and 
interpretation.  Second, this allows us to have an index that is more easily compared to our geographical damage 
index which is derived from a different data source (described below).  Nevertheless, in our sensitivity analysis we 
replace the single damage index with individual dummies for each damage level. 
14 Chomes vary greatly in size, ranging from a few hundred squared meters to several square kilometers.  However, 
the majority of the manufacturing plants within Kobe are located in chomes that tend to be just a few hundred 
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we know the number of buildings for each chome categorized by damage color.  This enables us 
to create a chome-level building damage indicator based on the percentage of damage to each 
building given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
j
jgreenjyellowjorangejredjpink
j total
greenwyellowworangewredwpinkw
DAMChome
×+×+×+×+×
=  
            [1] 
where the denominator, totalj, is the total number of buildings and red, pink, orange, yellow, and green 
are the number of buildings within chome j that are classified in each of these categories.  The 
weights w are the loss in value associated with each color assuming that losses are the midway 
points between the thresholds (except for the green category where we assume no loss).  We 
performed similar sensitivity checks to those employed for our building damage variables. 
Figure 2 presents the distribution of our ChomeDAM index.  One can immediately observe a 
wide variation in damages across individual chomes linked to geographical and building 
differences discussed in Section 2, as well as the unique ability of earthquakes to have very 
different impacts within narrowly defined areas.  One implication is that the assumption of 
spatial homogeneity in earthquake damage even at relatively small geographical areas such as 
chome level, let alone the city level, as previous studies have used, may induce a considerable 
degree of measurement error and hence attenuation bias. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Note that PlantDAM and ChomeDAM are zero prior to the earthquake and, for unaffected plants, 
after the earthquake. For affected plants they both take on positive value, depending on the 
extent of damages, for each year following the earthquake.  
 
3.2.3 Other Damage Indicators 
Previous studies in an attempt to identify spatial differences in earthquake damage have often 
used certain physical characteristics of the event such as distance to the epicentre or peak ground 
acceleration (Garmaise and Moskowitz 2009). We create similar proxies.  More specifically, the 
meters squared.  In order to confirm the accuracy of our geo-referencing of buildings and their damage type we 
overlaid our building shape-file with a shape-file of the chomes, calculated the number of buildings per se and per 
damage category per chome and compared this to the official aggregated data available, we found these to match 
almost perfectly. 
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distance to the epicentre (DISTEPI) is calculated as the straight-line distance from the epicentre 
to the latitude and longitude of a plant’s location.  In our sample the average plant is 18.6 km 
from the epicentre with a standard deviation of 13.5 kilometres.  To obtain a measure of peak 
ground acceleration we used the gridded shake map generated by Fujimoto and Midorikawa 
(2002) to allocate peak ground acceleration values to each plant’s building which we call 
SHAKE.15  Figure 3 shows the overall shake map for Kobe.  Because the grids of the shake-map 
are fairly large we overlay this with the building damage map data shown in Figure 4.  Figure 4 
shows the high degree of heterogeneity of damages even within shake-map cells. 
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
3.3 Other Data 
Although we know the level of damage of the building in which the plant is located, our dataset 
does not include building specific information on the type of construction.  However, the local 
authorities did collect information on building characteristics at the chome-level.  These include 
the number of buildings by year of construction and building construction types (brick, cement, 
wood and iron).  We use these to calculate the average age of buildings in a chome and shares of 
different building types within a given chome.  Other variables included in our analysis include 
dummy variables to capture whether a plant belongs to a multi-plant firm (MULTI), and whether 
or not the plant is in a designated reconstruction priority zone (RECON) where urban 
reconstruction costs were heavily subsidized and planning schemes were implemented to 
improve urban living (new roads, parks etc.).  Other standard controls that we include are the age 
of the plant (AGE) and the average wage within a plant (WAGE) as a proxy for the average skill 
level of the workforce.  Finally, we include a measure of total factor productivity (TFP) based on 
the approach outlined in Cui et al. (2012 and 2015) who construct a measure of TFP that does 
not require a direct measure of capital.  The online appendix outlines how we estimate TFP. We 
also capture productivity using the more traditional value added per worker (labprod). 
Finally, we also control for the effect of possible agglomeration forces (ClusterPlants) that will 
capture whether plants choose to geographically cluster in order to benefit from positive 
externalities of being near firms in the same industry (e.g. supply of workers with similar skills or 
15 We assumed that the age of building was the medium value between categorical thresholds.  For example, 
buildings constructed between 1955 and 1965 were assumed to be 44 years old in 1994. 
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established markets selling certain goods).  Hence, we include the variable ClusterPlants, which 
measures the number of plants within the same two-digit industry and same chome.16 
3.4 Data descriptives 
We now provide a brief description of our data.  In Table 1 we provide a summary of the 
industrial structure in Kobe as well as estimates of the average plant-level damage for each 
industry using the previously defined colors Pink (fire), Red (severe) and Orange (moderate), 
Yellow (low).  Table 1 shows that the rubber industry had the largest number of plants in Kobe, 
reflecting the fact that this industry includes the non-leather shoe firms.  The rubber industry 
also experienced a high level of moderate to severe damage (46.1%) with only the non-ferrous 
metals industry experiencing greater damage.  We are reassured that these summary statistics 
match the anecdotal evidence and Kobe City statistics.  
[Table 1 about here] 
In figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 we present descriptive evidence of changes in the number of plants, total 
employment, the exit rate of plants and the number of new plant births over our time period.17  
The immediate observation from figure 5 is that the number of plants in Kobe fell from over 
4300 to around 2100 by 2007, coupled with a steadily declining workforce which fell from over 
100,000 to a little over 70,000 by 2007 (figure 6).  In figure 7 we can observe the large increase in 
the exit rate in the year after the earthquake in 1995 where it reached close to 14% in 1995 
before remaining relatively stable at below 10% for the rest of the sample period. Note that the 
1995 exit rate in figure 7 is actually the average exit rate for 1994 and 1995 since missing data for 
1994 means we cannot accurately identify whether a firm that was present in our dataset in 1993 
but not in 1995 actually died in 1994 or 1995. Taking the average is likely to provide a 
conservative estimate of the real 1995 exit rate as we are giving equal weight to exit rates in 1994 
and 1995 when, in reality, the latter was likely to have been larger. Finally, Figure 8 provides the 
number of new plant births in Kobe between 1993 and 2007. As can be seen, relative to 1993 
plant births fell following the earthquake but rose steadily until 1998 only to fall again. The same 
pattern then appears to be repeated for the remaining years of the sample.  
16 We also define clusters by (1) the number of other plants within the same industry as plant i within the same or 
neighboring chomes (ClusterPlantsNb), (2) the level of employment within the same industry as plant i within the 
same or neighboring chomes (ClusterEmp), and (3) the level of employment within the same industry and same 
chome (ClusterEmpNb). See Collins (2008) for a discussion of the post-earthquake biomedical cluster in Kobe. 
17 Since births are defined as a the new appearance of a plant in our sample it is not possible to identify a new plant 
in the first year of our sample. Similarly, deaths are identified by a firm disappearing from the sample. Figures 7 and 
8 therefore provide deaths and births, respectively, for 1993-2007. 
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[Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 about here] 
Table 2 provides the change in labor productivity over the sample period for new entrants, 
plants that died during the sample period and for continuing plants. 18  As can be seen, 
productivity growth of new entrants is higher than for dying or continuing plants. It is notable 
that plants that subsequently died during the sample period and continuing plants all, on average, 
experienced a reduction in productivity over our sample period. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Appendix Tables A1 and A2 provide a description of our variables and summary statistics.  
Table A2 shows for example that the average age of a plant is just over 18 years old, and 14% of 
plants are part of a multi-plant firm.  Note that 40% of plants were designated as being located in 
one of the special reconstruction zones defined earlier.  Finally, most firms were built between 
1966 and 1975 and are fairly equally distributed between brick, wood, steel and reinforced 
concrete. 
4. Decomposition Analysis 
Given our interest in the impact of the Kobe earthquake on productivity, our first empirical 
exercise decomposes aggregate changes in average sectoral labor productivity (valued added per 
worker) for 26 sectors in Kobe into changes in productivity due to plants exiting, plants entering 
and plants that survive the earthquake and continue to operate. Following Baily et al. (1992) we 
use sectoral weights to obtain the overall average for sales for the start and end year of each data 
point.  Although there is inter-annual variability, there is a clear rising trend in labor productivity 
in the first seven years following the earthquake.  The rise in productivity between the first year 
of our sample and the end year (1992-2007) is 14.8 per cent. 
In order to gauge what role earthquake damage might have played in the observed rise in labor 
productivity in Kobe over our sample period we employ a simple accounting exercise developed 
by Foster et al. (2006).  More specifically, Foster et al. (2006) decompose the change in sectoral 
productivity into the component due to the performance of continuing plants (C), that due to 
entering plants (N), and the component resulting from the exit of plants (X).  We expand this 
decomposition to further disentangle the separate roles of plants affected (d=1) and those little 
affected or not affected by earthquake damage: 
18 For plants that died during our sample period the productivity change is calculated between 1993 and the final 
year of the plant’s existence. 
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            [2] 
where LP denotes labor productivity, s is the employment share of the plant group in question, 
and i, e, and t subscripts refer to industry, establishment and time, respectively.  The second, 
third and fourth terms (CONTINUING) are a combination of three different effects.  First, a 
“within” effect that captures the changes in productivity within continuing establishments’, i.e., 
those that were present in both 1992 and 2007, weighted by their initial share of sectoral 
employment.  Second, a “between” effect that represents the component due to changing shares 
of continuing establishments, weighted by deviations from the initial industry level average 
productivity and finally a third “cross” term.  The “cross” term is positive if on average 
continuing establishments that have had a positive productivity change, increased employment 
and/or that those with negative productive changes are likely to have decreased their 
employment levels.  In contrast, if the “cross” term is negative then on average those firms that 
increased their employment share experienced a fall in productivity and those that saw a 
reduction in employment experienced an increase in productivity.  In our analysis we sum the 
within, between and cross effects together to get an overall picture for continuing firms. 
The first and final terms in equation (2) represent the role played by exits (EXITS) and entrants 
(ENTRANTS) in sectoral labor productivity changes, respectively.  In terms of implementing 
equation (2) in our context there are a number of points to note.  First, we look at changes 
between the first year of our sample, 1992, and 2007 at the end of our sample period.  We are 
therefore implicitly missing any plants that enter after the earthquake but exit before the end 
point.  Second, the definition of damaged (where d=1), differs between plants that continue or 
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exit and plant births.  In the former we simply use building damage.  In the latter, those plants 
that enter are classified according to the average level of building damage within the chome in 
which they choose to locate. 
As a starting point, to classify plants into a damage category we use a building damage level of 
20% (i.e. color code yellow) and an equivalent chome damage level cut-off.  In Table 3, column 
(1) presents the results for each decomposition term, as a percentage of average sectoral labor 
productivity growth.  The largest contributors to the overall growth in labor productivity are the 
entrants (ENTRANTS), both those that locate in damaged chomes and those that locate in 
undamaged chomes.  This is consistent with the strong positive change in labor productivity for 
new entrants reported in Table 2. In contrast, for continuing plants, we find that while both 
damaged and undamaged surviving plants have tended to reduce sectoral productivity, the 
overall negative effect is substantially larger for undamaged plants (-0.49) than for their damaged 
counterparts (-0.23).  In other words, if damaged plants survive they tend to be relatively more 
productive than those that are not directly damaged.  This result is an indication that there may 
have been an element of a “build back better” effect which raises future productivity. 
[Table 3 about here] 
When we compare the relative contribution to sectoral productivity we find that there is a 
noticeably larger contribution from the exit of damaged rather than undamaged plants (0.13 
versus 0.09).  In contrast, for new entrants, although both positive, those plants that choose to 
locate in damaged chomes contribute substantially less to the overall rise in sectoral labor 
productivity than those that choose to locate in undamaged areas.  One possible explanation is 
that subsidies encourage plants to start up in damaged areas and in new sectors.  In contrast, the 
productivity contribution of plant closures, as can be seen from the shares of the EXITS 
component, was somewhat larger for damaged plants.  This is again suggestive of a cleansing 
effect where earthquake damage results in the closure of the most inefficient plants thereby 
increasing the average productivity of survivors. 19 
19 Fukao and Kwon (2006) undertake a decomposition of total factor productivity growth in manufacturing for 
Japan as a whole over the period 1994-2001. They find that the very slow (0.31%) TFP growth over this period 
decomposes into a large entrant effect (0.16), consistent with our analysis for 1992-2007. However, in contrast to 
our analysis they find that continuing plants made a positive 0.22 contribution to TFP growth while exiters made a 
negative 0.07 contribution. We are very reluctant to infer that these differences may be due to the effect of the 
earthquake and instead believe that they are likely to be driven by the idiosyncratic nature of the Kobe economy and 
its reliance on traditional, declining industry together with the differences in our study and that of Fukao and Kwon 
(2006) referred to above. 
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In columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 we use different cut-off damage levels to classify plants.  First, 
we increase the minimum damage both at the plant level for continuing and exiting plants and at 
the chome level for entrants from 20% to 50%. We also reclassify plants as damaged only if their 
building was completely destroyed, but since there were very few chomes completely destroyed 
we used the corresponding minimum damage level of 75%.  The components that determine the 
trend in labor productivity are similar.  Comparing damaged to undamaged plants shows that the 
within components remain relatively unchanged both qualitatively and quantitatively.  The main 
exception, however, is in terms of the within productivity component of continuing plants.  In 
particular, as one increases the threshold damage level the negative contribution of surviving 
damaged plants falls considerably, while that of undamaged plants rises.  This suggests that 
plants in less damaged buildings suffered greater productivity losses, perhaps because they did 
not have to do as much capital and infrastructure updating as those that were located in 
buildings that were severely damaged.  Likewise, damaged plants were able to access funds for 
investment at a low cost which put undamaged plants at a potential competitive disadvantage. 
5. Plant Exits 
In the previous section the suggestion is that the least productive plants exit through a cleansing 
effect that increased the average productivity of survivors.  To investigate further we use a Cox 
proportional hazard modelling approach (Cox, 1972) to quantify the effect of earthquake damage 
on plant survival in the short term but also over subsequent years.  Of course some, or even 
possibly all, of any difference in survival rates between damaged and non-damaged plants could 
feasibly be due to differences in other characteristics.  To disentangle the quantitative effect of 
earthquake damage more precisely we thus estimate a Cox proportional hazards model.  We 
denote the hazard rate of plant i by λit which represents the probability that the plant exits in 
interval t to t+1, conditional upon having survived until period t given by: 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆0(𝑡𝑡)𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝒁𝒁β)      [3] 
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard, t is the analysis time, Z is a vector of explanatory variables, and 
β are our parameters to be estimated.  A key feature of the Cox model is that the baseline hazard 
is given no particular parameterization and can be left un-estimated.  However, the proportional 
hazards assumption requires that each plant’s hazard is a constant multiplicative replica of 
another plant’s hazard. 20  The effect of the function exp (Zβ) in equation (3) is to scale the 
20 Equation (3) can be modified to incorporate unobservable heterogeneity across plants or ‘frailty’ as it is often 
known.  If not controlled for, frailty can reduce the magnitude of estimated coefficients (or hazard ratios) and can 
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baseline hazard function that is common to all units up or down.  The implication is that the 
effect of covariates in proportional hazards models is assumed to be fixed over time.  We test 
this assumption by analysing the residuals following Grambsch and Therneau (1994).21 
Apart from our damage proxies, vector Z contains other variables likely to influence plant 
survival described in the previous section.  In addition, the previous literature has established 
that a number of factors influence the survival of plants.  For example, Dunne et al. (1988, 1989) 
establish the important role played by plant age and size and most subsequent papers confirm 
these findings (for example Bernard et al. 2006, Haltiwanger et al. 2013 and Fort et al. 2013).  
Bernard and Jensen (2007) find that multi-plant and multinational firms in the US have lower 
survival rates, while Gorg Görg and Strobl (2003) find that Irish plants that are majority foreign 
owned also have lower survival rates.  Disney et al. (2003) in a study of UK manufacturing plants 
find that those that belong to a larger group are less likely to fail.  Bernard et al. (2006), along 
with several others (e.g. Bernard and Jensen 2007), also emphasises the positive role played by 
productivity which is shown to increase survival rates.  Neffke et al. (2012) examine the effect of 
agglomeration economies on plant survival and find that results differ depending on the type and 
age of the plant.  Finally, in a related study, Falck (2007) finds that a new establishment has a 
greater survival probability the greater the number of new businesses in the same region and 
same industry. 
Given the literature discussed above we include the following control variables.  To capture firm 
size we include dummy variables for three of the four quartiles of total employment (the first 
quartile dummy is omitted).  Including a continuous measure of size does not change the results 
qualitatively or quantitatively.  We also include a measure of the average wage within a plant 
(WAGE) as a proxy for the skill level of the workforce.  Finally, we include a measure of TFP on 
the basis that productive plants are more likely to survive than less productive plants.  We also 
examine whether being part of a multi-plant firm helps survival (MULTI) and whether a plant 
being originally located in a reconstruction zone (RECON) influences the probability of survival.  
Given that the close proximity to other plants in the same industry may also impact on survival 
either positively or negatively, we also include our agglomeration measure (CLUSTER).  While 
change the interpretation of hazard ratios which, in the presence of frailty, would decline over time.  We therefore 
test a specification in which plant-specific frailty is included and which provides an estimate of θ, the frailty variance 
component.  In all estimations θ was not statistically significant and was very close to zero.  These results suggest 
that frailty is neither economically nor statistically significant in our models.  As a result, the estimated hazard ratios 
with and without frailty are identical (to at least 4 decimal places).  Hence, we exclude frailty from our main results 
although our sensitivity analysis does include a parametric model which incorporates plant-specific frailty. 
21 More specifically we undertake a test of nonzero slope in a generalized linear regression of the scaled Schoenfeld 
(1982) residuals on functions of time.  
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older plants are more likely to survive than younger plants we cannot include a direct measure of 
plant age in a Cox proportional hazards model as it would be collinear with the baseline hazard 
function.  Therefore, we include plant age in 1995 (AGE) as a time invariant measure of plant 
age. 
We also include 162 industry dummies, year dummies, and dummies to capture the possible 
influence of being located in different wards within Kobe city.  Finally, we include five different 
dummies for the average age of the buildings within each plant’s chome and the share of 
building construction types within each chome (wooden, reinforced concrete, steel or brick).  
These additional controls also demonstrate the richness of the data and how the inclusion of 
these dummies helps to mitigate a number of the endogeneity concerns present when more 
aggregate damage proxies are used. 
In our dataset we identify plant death if a plant was present in one or more years and then 
disappears from the dataset.22 Since we are missing data for 1994, this means that plants present 
in our data in 1993 that were not present in 1995 could have died in either 1994 (i.e. pre-quake) 
or in 1995 (post-quake). In our survival analysis we therefore omit the pre-quake period and 
hence the earliest plant deaths that we can capture are plants that were present in our data in 
1995 but not in 1996. We are therefore trying to ascertain how those plants that survived the 
immediate effects of the earthquake were subsequently affected by any earthquake damage 
incurred. 
Before proceeding to our analysis it is important to state the identifying assumption behind our 
econometric specifications.  Essentially, an unbiased estimate of the impact of our damage 
variables hinges on the assumption that after controlling for plant-level characteristics prior to 
the earthquake and the building types within chomes, any differences in damages experienced are 
not correlated with other unobservable determinants of plant performance.  A concern might be 
that some plants chose their location so as to reduce their exposure to seismic risk and that these 
plants are also characterized by other factors that would influence their survival regardless of 
whether an earthquake had occurred or not.  As noted earlier, we are confident that the 
earthquake was unexpected, so that such anticipatory behaviour would have been unlikely.  
Nevertheless, even if this was not the case it could be by pure chance that those plants that were 
anyway more likely to survive happened to be located in buildings that were more or less 
earthquake proof or in areas with overall less or more damage.  However, we believe that the 
number of plant-level explanatory variables that the census provides us with makes such a 
22 This is appropriate since our dataset is comprehensive and includes all manufacturing plants in Kobe. 
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violation of the assumption unlikely.  One aspect that we do not capture are the characteristics of 
the actual plant’s building.  Instead, as described above, we have chome level measures of 
building types, namely the age and construction material type.  Reassuringly though, chomes tend 
to be fairly homogenous in their building type.  For example, in 50% of all chomes the dominant 
building type constituted over 75% of all buildings with a standard deviation of 0.15%.  Similarly, 
while the average age of buildings for those built after 1945 was approximately 33 years, the 
standard deviation within chomes was only eight years.  In contrast, there is clearly more within-
chome heterogeneity in terms of damage type of buildings.  For example, the most dominant 
building type constituted less (69%) than the distribution of building types and almost double the 
standard deviation (0.28%). 
Nevertheless, to ensure that plant characteristics are not influencing the earthquake damage 
incurred by plants we estimate a cross-sectional regression expressing plant-level earthquake 
damage as a function of pre-earthquake plant-level characteristics age, size, wage, TFP and our 
cluster variable (the model also contains controls for industry, age of buildings in chome and 
type of buildings in chome.)  None of these plant-level characteristics are statistically significant 
determinants of plant-level earthquake damage (even at 10% significance levels).23   
We now turn to our results.  Our main survival analysis results are presented in Table 4.  To help 
with the interpretation of the coefficients recall that a hazard ratio on a continuous variable (e.g. 
WAGE) of, for example, 1.1, is interpreted as saying that a 1 unit change in that variable 
increases the hazard of plant exit by 10%.  Similarly, if the hazard ratio is 0.9 then a 1 unit 
increase in the variable reduces the hazard by 10%.24 
[Table 4 about here] 
We begin in Columns (1) and (2) with measures of earthquake damage that have previously been 
used as proxies for damage but do not take into account the possibility of heterogeneity in 
damage to plants within relatively small geographical areas.  The variables are the distance to the 
epicentre and local peak ground acceleration.  In terms of distance to the epicentre we find, 
surprisingly, a hazard ratio that is significantly greater than one, suggesting that within the City of 
Kobe the further away from the epicentre the greater the chance of plant closure.  Although 
seemingly counter-intuitive, the result is explained by the actual pattern of the earthquake 
23 Results are provided in Table A of the online appendix. 
24 As previously discussed, for each model we test whether the effect of covariates is constant over time.  For the 
models in Table 4 we find that this assumption is inappropriate for the variables WAGE and RECON.  We 
therefore interact these variables with a linear time trend, thereby allowing the hazard ratio to vary over time.  The 
inclusion of these interactions does not affect the sign and significance of these or any other variables. 
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damage which was concentrated in a narrow strip of land stretching away from the epicentre 
which we previously discusssed in Section 2.  Our result highlights the potential problems with 
using simple distance to the epicentre as a proxy for plant damage.  Model (2) includes our 
measure of local peak ground acceleration, SHAKE (illustrated in figures 3 and 4).  Our results 
show that SHAKE is not statistically significant.  One explanation for this insignificance is again 
the level of heterogeneity shown in figure 4 and discussed in Section 3.2. 
A third measure of damage that has been previously used in the literature is a regional or local 
spatial measure of damage.  Hence, in model (3) we include the average building damage at the 
chome-level (ChomeDAM).  The estimated coefficient is also statistically insignificant.  Figure 4 
shows that giving each building within a chome a damage index based on our color classification 
will induce considerable measurement error.  This again shows the importance of local damage 
heterogeneity. 
We now turn to our plant specific damage variables.  Our building-level damage variable 
(PlantDAM) is included in model (4).  This variable is statistically significant with a hazard ratio 
of 1.61 suggesting that a one unit increase in damage (representing a 100% damaged building) 
leads to a 61% increase in the probability of permanent plant closure.  In column (5) we include 
a smoothed plant damage variable (SMOOTH) that takes into account damage to plants nearby 
as a robustness check.  Reassuringly, the results are quantitatively similar to our PlantDam 
variable.25  In model (6) in addition to our plant damage variable we also control for the average 
level of ChomeDAM but this has little effect on the PlantDAM variable and is, in itself 
insignificant.  Note, however, that including these damage variables in this manner allows only 
for a permanent impact of earthquake damage on plant survival. 
More realistically, one might expect the impact of earthquake damage on the chance of survival 
to decline over time.  In model (7) we interact the chome-level damage and plant-level damage 
variables with Time, a variable capturing the number of years that have passed since the 
earthquake. We now find that ChomeDAM is statistically significant, with a hazard ratio indicating 
that greater chome level damage increases the probability of plant exit.  The magnitude of the 
hazard ratio on ChomeDAM is now greater than that on PlantDAM although the Time interaction 
terms reveal that the negative effect of these factors on survival diminishes over time and 
declines more rapidly for ChomeDAM. 
25 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion.  The SMOOTH variable is calculated as the 
average damage for all buildings within 100m of the plant (excluding own plant damage).  The results give us 
confidence that our plant damage variable does not suffer from the endogeneity concerns discussed in Section 3.4. 
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Turning to our other control variables the coefficients are remarkably stable across all 
specifications.  More specifically, we find that older plants and higher wage paying plants are less 
likely to exit but the effect is small.  Our size variables all have hazard ratios below one indicating 
that larger plants are less likely to exit relative to the smallest plants which form the omitted 
category.  Plants that are part of a multi-plant firm appear to be more likely to close, a finding 
consistent with Bernard and Jensen’s (2007) and Craioveanu and Terrell (2016)’s finding for US 
plants and explained by firms moving production to other plants within the firm instead of 
repairing the damaged plant and resuming production.  Our TFP variable has a hazard ratio of 
less than 1 suggesting that more productive firms are more likely to survive (in unreported 
results our simple labor productivity variable gives a similar result).  Finally, our measure of the 
degree of plant agglomeration (ClusterPlants) which measures the number of plants from the same 
2-digit industry in a given chome has a hazard ratio greater than 1.  This suggests that plants that 
belong to a cluster are more likely to exit and may reflect the increased competition associated 
with a heavy spatial concentration of plants from the same industry and more importantly a 
breakdown of agglomeration economies that had previously allowed the cluster to thrive despite, 
for example, increased competition from China.26  Our variable to capture whether a plant was 
located in one of the eight special reconstruction zones is not significant. 
In Table 5 we further investigate our primary finding that plant damage significantly impacts the 
probability of plant survival.  For reasons of space, we report only results for our damage 
variables, although each model includes all of the plant characteristics reported in Table 4 
together with our industry, year, and ward dummies, and the age and type of buildings in each 
chome.  In model (1) we replace our Cox proportional hazard model with a Probit model to 
estimate the probability of plant exit.  PlantDAM is again shown to be a positive and statistically 
significant determinant of plant exit although its interaction term with years since the earthquake 
is not significant while ChomeDAM and its interaction term with Time both remain significant.  
Model (2) is a parametric survival model provided for comparison and incorporates plant-
specific frailty, as previously discussed.27  PlantDAM and its interaction with time are statistically 
significant, as are ChomeDAM and its interaction with time. We also report θ, the frailty variance 
component which is insignificant and close to zero indicating that frailty has almost no effect 
within this model. 
26 We also alternatively used our other clustering proxies described in the data section.  These results are reported in 
the online Appendix (Table B) and are very similar in terms of sign and significance.  
27 The parametric model was estimating using the exponential distribution.  Of all the available distributions, the 
exponential distribution provided the lowest Akaike Information Criterion.  Frailty itself is modelled using a gamma 
distribution. 
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Model 3 replaces our PlantDAM variable in the Cox proportional hazard model with individual 
dummy variables for pink, red, orange, and yellow levels of damage, where green (no damage) is 
the omitted category.  We also include the ChomeDAM variable but exclude time interactions so 
that we are able to see how the hazard shifts across categories.  The results suggest that it is pink 
and red damage that is driving our results.  However, when we include chome damage and time 
interactions in model (4) we find that all four dummy variables, together with their time 
interactions, are statistically significant.  As one might have expected, the hazard ratios for pink 
and red plant damage are larger than those for orange and yellow damage.  Model 5 includes 
individual variables capturing the chome-level share of each building damage type together with 
their interactions with time.  The proportion of red, orange and yellow damaged buildings in a 
chome is found to significantly influence plant exit.  The magnitude of the hazard ratios on the 
chome damage variables are broadly similar to those on the plant damage variables and, again, 
the hazard ratios decline over time. 
[Table 5 about here] 
In almost all cases we find that not only are our plant and chome level damages variables 
significant but so are their time interaction terms, where the hazard ratios suggest a negative 
impact that declines over time.  In Figure 9 we plot the implied plant specific damage hazard 
ratios over time for the final model in our main results table (model 7 in Table 4), and, 
separately, for the individual levels of damage (model 5 in Table 5).  Observe that the hazard 
ratio remains above one until at least 2002 for all but the most minor level of damage (yellow).  
This suggests that plants that were damaged by the earthquake were more likely to exit than 
undamaged plants for up to seven years after the earthquake.  For plants that experienced fire 
(pink) damage, the effect lasted for up to nine years.  Plants that experienced the least severe 
yellow level of damage were more likely to exit than undamaged plants for up to five years after 
the earthquake.28  However, figure 9 also shows that the greatest exit rate was immeditately 
following the earthquake (consistent with figure 7). 
[Figure 9 about here] 
For reasons of space we do not plot the hazard ratios associated with chome level damages over 
time.  However, the results from model 7 in Table 4 and models 2 and 5 in Table 5 indicate that 
the effects of ChomeDAM are of a similar, or even greater, magnitude than the effects of 
PlantDAM but are shorter lasting.  More specifically, within four years plants that were located in 
28 Hazard ratios from models 2 and 4 in Table 5 are plotted in Figure C in the online Appendix. In each case the 
duration of the earthquake impact from these models is very similar to those presented in Figure 9. 
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a chome that suffered complete building damage were no more likely to exit than plants that did 
not experience any damage. 
To assess the sensitivity of our results to the construction of our single index PlantDAM variable, 
which uses the median value of damage within each damage category, we randomised this factor 
for each damage category.  Firstly, we assigned the same randomly chosen damage value to all 
plants within a damage category.  Secondly, we randomly assigned a different value of damage to 
each plant within a category.  For both procedures the randomly chosen value was bounded by 
the upper and lower damage values within each category.29  This exercise was conducted 500 
times for each case and then our specification of model (7) in Table 4 re-estimated.  Figures D 
and E in the online appendix depict the distribution of the estimated hazard ratio derived from 
the coefficients on the plant specific damage variable and its interaction with time.  More 
specifically, Figure D provides the mean, 5% level and 95% level of implied hazard ratios over 
time from the 500 different estimations in which the same randomly chosen damage value is 
assigned to each plant within a damage category, whereas Figure E provides the counterpart for 
when a different randomly chosen damage value is assigned to each plant within a damage 
category.  In both exercises, the PlantDAM and PlantDAM*Time variables were significant in all 
500 estimations.  The two figures show that the mean hazard ratio is similar in magnitude to 
those from the ‘main Cox’ model in Figure 9, although there is more confidence in the estimated 
effect from the sample where plants’ damage values can differ from those of other plants in the 
same damage category.  These results provide some confidence that the results are not sensitive 
to the manner in which the PlantDAM index was constructed. 
Finally, we try to throw some light on the nature of the plants most likely to fail as a result of 
earthquake damage. We do this using the model (7) specification in Table 4 applied to various 
sub-samples of our data. Specifically, we estimate the model, separately, for the lowest quartile of 
plants in terms of TFP, labor productivity, size, age and skill-level (measured using average 
wage). Having estimated hazard ratios for each of these sub-samples we can then compare them 
with the hazard ratio for the full-sample to see if, for instance, plants in the lowest quartile in 
terms of TFP have higher hazard ratios than the average plant in the full sample. Table 6 
provides the estimated hazard ratios for each sub-sample which, for convenience, can be 
compared to the hazard ratio for the full sample in column (1). Table 6 also indicates if the 
hazard ratios for each sub-sample are statistically different to those from the full sample using 
Likelihood Ratio tests. Compared to the full sample the hazard ratio on PlantDAM is greater in 
29 For the chome level damage variable we similarly randomly assigned a value within each category’s upper and 
lower threshold. 
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magnitude, and statistically different to the hazard ratio for the full sample, for plants that are in 
the lowest quartile in terms of TFP, labor productivity, size and skill-level.  This indicates that 
unproductive, small,  low-skill plants were more likely to immediately fail as a result of 
earthquake damage than the average plant in the sample. The hazard ratio for the youngest 
quartile of plants is not statistically different to that from the full sample. The interaction of 
PlantDAM with time suggests that the effect of earthquake damage on unproductive, small, low-
skill plants lasts for a similar length of time to the plants in the full sample. 
[Table 6 about here] 
6. Continuing Plants 
Having examined the effect of earthquake damage on plant survival more generally, we now 
investigate how such damage may have affected the performance of surviving plants.  Note that 
we limit our sample to those plants that are still operating at the end of our sample period (the 
results do not change substantially when we include those plants that exited during the period).  
Our final sample consists of a balanced panel of 835 surviving plants for the period 1992-2007.  
Starting in 1992 means we have plant data before and after the earthquake.  We estimate a fixed 
effects panel model of the following form: 
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     [4] 
where Yit denotes the log of labor productivity or TFP, in plant i, year t, X is a vector of 
explanatory variables, including our earthquake damage proxies, and α and γ are plant and year 
fixed effects, respectively.  As previously pointed out, our measures of damage PlantDAM and 
ChomeDAM, take on a value of zero prior to the earthquake and then, for affected plants, take on 
a positive value, depending on the damage incurred, from then onwards.  For undamaged plants 
they are consistently zero throughout the period.  This sort of modelling is equivalent to a 
difference-in-difference analysis where the treatment is of a continuous (rather than binary) 
nature once treatment occurs. 30 Equation (4) is estimated using Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
standard errors which are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional and temporal 
dependence. 
Table 7 presents the results for equation (4) where each of our left hand side variables is 
estimated with and without time interaction terms.  The results in columns (2) and (4) show that 
our plant-damage variable is positive and significant when we include time interaction terms, 
30 This is a standard tool in the econometric assessment of shocks; see for instance Angrist and Pischke (2008). 
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with the interaction terms being negative.  This suggests that the earthquake had a positive effect 
on plant productivity although this effect falls over time.  Hence, model (2) shows that a one unit 
increase in PlantDAM initially increases labor productivity of surviving plants by 1.10%, with this 
effect falling to zero after eight years.  The effect for labor productivity is similar.  One 
explanation is that this is capturing a build-back-better effect if surviving plants replaced 
earthquake damaged physical capital with newer, more efficient capital. In terms of labor 
productivity it may be that the least skilled workers left Kobe post-earthquake as they may have 
had less incentive to see if their jobs at damaged plants would resume following reconstruction.  
Alternatively, they may simply have been laid off by the plant as a short term cost saving exercise 
until the plant was repaired at which time new workers were hired.  An alternative explanation of 
why damage increases the productivity of surviving plants is simply that plants that are on an 
increasing productivity trajectory rebuild and those with declining productivity do not rebuild. 
For labor productivity ChomeDAM has a negative effect with the effect getting smaller over time 
as expected.  Both of our productivity variables were positively influenced by the level of wages 
and whether or not the plant was within a reconstruction zone and negatively affected by being 
part of a multi-plant firm. 
[Table 7 about here] 
7. Plant Entrants 
Until now we have concentrated on how the Kobe earthquake affected plants that existed at the 
time of the earthquake.  In our final analysis we consider the effect of earthquake damage on 
plant births.  We undertake this analysis at the chome level and estimate the following regression: 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 + 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖   [5] 
where α and γ are chome and year fixed effects, respectively, and vector Z contains chome-level 
earthquake damage as well as road damage, whether or not the chome was part of a 
reconstruction zone, and the number of plants within the chome in the previous year. Subscripts 
j and t denote chomes and years, respectively.  Equation (5) is estimated using a fixed effects 
negative binomial approach in order to account for both the count data nature of the dependent 
variable and for the over-dispersion of the data.31 Note that our sample period for this analysis 
begins in 1993 rather than 1992 as 1993 is the first year in which births can be identified. This 
31 We also estimate the probability of plant birth using a fixed effects logit model with the results reported in the 
online appendix (Table C).  In each case the results were similar to those estimated using the fixed effects negative 
binomial regression. 
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reflects the fact that births are identified by the presence of a new firm in the sample which was 
not present in previous years. Note also that this method of identifying new births means births 
identified in 1995 could actually have occurred in our missing year, 1994. For this reason we omit 
1995 from the analysis although the inclusion of this year has no impact on the sign and 
significance of our results. 
Table 8 presents the results of our chome-level estimates of the determinants of plant births.  In 
models (1) and (2) we use the ChomeDAM variable with and without time interactions, 
respectively, while models (3) and (4) separate damages into the different damage categories, 
again with and without time interactions.  We find that ChomeDAM deters plant births and that 
this effect does not statistically change over time as shown in model (2).  In model (1), for 
example, ChomeDAM has a coefficient of -0.96 which corresponds to an incidence rate ratio of 
0.38, implying that a 100% damaged chome would have only 38% of the births of an undamaged 
chome.  Interestingly, the reconstruction dummy, RECON, is negative and significant indicating 
that being classified as a reconstruction zone reduces plant births.  From model (1), 
reconstruction zones only experienced 26% of the births in non-reconstruction zones.  This may 
relate to the nature of the reconstruction which was often residential and retail.  Kobe planners 
were also keen to ensure that the city did not make the mistakes of the past, for example relying 
too heavily on wooden buildings.  For that reason, reconstruction zones may have been subject 
to more, rather than less, stringent planning regulations. 
The results of models (3) and (4) show that the number of buildings that were fire damaged in a 
chome (pink) did not influence plant births in a statistically significant manner, but the level of 
severely damaged buildings (red) increased plant births.  The incidence rate ratio for 
ChomeDAMRed in model (3) tells us that a chome in which all buildings experienced ‘red’ damage 
would experience 84% more plant births than an undamaged chome.  This suggests that the fact 
that buildings were razed to the ground in the most severely damaged chomes meant new 
investment and plant births were more likely.  In contrast, being moderately damaged reduces 
plant births, with ‘orange’ and ‘yellow’ chomes experiencing only 25% and 47%, respectively, of 
the births of an undamaged chome.  The results help explain the strong effect on productivity of 
plants entering into undamaged areas from Table 2 as there are many more of them. 
[Table 8 about here] 
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8. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the impact of the Kobe 1995 earthquake on the birth, life and 
possibly death of manufacturing plants using a spatially heterogenous measure of plant damage.  
More specifically, we assemble an exhaustive panel of manufacturing plants spanning the period 
1992 to 2007 and construct building-specific and area-specific measures of damage.  We are also 
able to control for average building type and age at the local geographical level to help address 
various endogeneity concerns.  Our decomposition results show that the increase in productivity 
post-earthquake was driven by the exit of plants and the entry of new plants into undamaged 
areas.  Although continuing plants had an overall negative effect on overall productivity, 
damaged plants did relatively better over our time period.  Our survival analysis results show that 
plant survival is negatively impacted by plant-level damage and that this effect persists for a 
number of years.  More precisely, damaged plants are more likely to fail than undamaged plants 
up until 2002 which is seven years after the earthquake.  This result is in stark contrast to the 
more macroeconomic studies where the implied duration was much more short-term.  Our 
results also indicate that damage to local infrastructure affects plant failure, although such effects 
do not last as long as the effects of plant damage.  What is evident is that studies that employ far 
more aggregated measures of damage using shake maps or broad regional measures of damage 
are subject to considerable measurement error due to the heterogeneous nature of damage 
caused by natural disasters, especially earthquakes. 
In further analysis we show that compared to the average plants those most likely to cease 
trading were the relatively unproductive, small, young and low-skill plants.  In terms of 
productivity at least, this suggests that natural disasters may play a cleansing role similar to that 
performed by recessions (Caballero and Hammour 1994 and Ouyang 2009).  While an 
assessment of the overall impact on welfare of the Kobe earthquake is beyond the remit of this 
paper, such a cleansing role would partially mitigate some of the other economic losses generated 
by the earthquake.  Examining the productivity performance of plants that survived the 
earthquake we discover evidence consistent with a build back better behaviour among those 
plants that survived.  More precisely, we find that the productivity of damaged plants increased 
in the years following the earthquake although this disappeared 8 years after the earthquake. 
The policy implications are necessarily nuanced.  In one respect, policies that provided 
subsidised loans to damaged plants may well have helped plants survive in the short term and 
help maintain employment levels.  The downside is that this increased indebtedness and when 
combined with a sluggish Japanese economy meant that plants continued to exit in the years 
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following the earthquake.  Likewise, policies to encourage plants to locate in certain areas and in 
certain sectors may not have been a cost effective use of funds.  However, stronger policy 
perscriptions are not possible without a more indepth analysis of the financial and non-financial 
aid provided to plants in the aftermath of the earthquake. 
Finally, more generally, our paper provides a number of suggestions for the literature on the 
economic impact of natural disasters.  Natural disasters tend to be localised events and moving 
beyond the micro-level impact is likely to mask the size and duration of any local impacts.  
Related to this, it is important to be able to precisely capture the heterogeneous nature of these 
large negative shocks across space in order to have reasonable confidence in their estimated 
consequences. 
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Figure 1. Manufacturing Output in Kobe and the Rest of Japan Relative to Pre-Earthquake 
Levels (1993=100) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Chome-Level Damages Based on the Average Percentage of Damage to Each Building 
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Figure 3: A Shake-Map of Kobe City Showing Variation in Peak-Velocity (cm/s). 
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Figure 4: A Shake-Map of a Small Area of Kobe City Showing Building Damage Heterogeneity. 
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Figure 5. The Number of Manufacturing Plants in Kobe Pre and Post Earthquake 
 
Figure 6. Total Employment in Manufacturing in Kobe Pre and Post Earthquake 
 
Figure 7. The Exit Rate of Manufacturing Plants in Kobe Pre and Post Earthquake* 
 
* Note that the 1995 exit rate is an average of the 1994 and 1995 exit rates 
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Figure 8. The Number of New Plant Births in Kobe Pre and Post Earthquake* 
 
* Note that the number of births in 1995 is an average of the births in 1994 and 1995  
 
Figure 9. Plant Damage Hazard Ratios Over Time (from Table 4 (model 7) and Table 5 (model 
5)) 
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Table 1. Damage by Industry (Ranked by All Damage).1 
Industry % of Sample 
All 
Damage PINK RED ORANGE YELLOW 
Non-Ferrous Metals 0.6 85.4 0 15.6 38.5 31.3 
Rubber 17 76.2 5.5 24.8 15.8 30.1 
Leather and Fur 6.8 74.8 7.5 19.8 16.8 30.7 
Information & Communication 
Machinery 0.4 71.6 0 33.8 8.1 29.7 
Pulp, Paper 2.5 71.5 3.4 16.5 21.7 29.9 
Furniture 1.4 70.9 0 16.9 23.5 30.5 
Industrial Machinery 6 69.1 0.6 14.1 14.9 39.5 
Printing 10.5 68.1 0.9 16.5 19.1 31.6 
General Machinery 4.6 63.4 1.2 10.4 11.4 40.4 
Textiles 4.8 62.4 0 17.4 19.5 25.5 
Plastic Products 1.8 60 0 14.9 17.6 27.5 
Metal Products 8.6 59.3 1.9 11.2 18.5 27.7 
Wood Lumber 1.8 58.3 0 16 17.3 25 
Electronic Machinery 3 56.5 3.6 10.1 12.7 30.1 
Transport Machinery 5.1 56.2 1.8 8.1 20.7 25.6 
Chemicals 1.2 55.6 13.1 19.2 4.6 18.7 
Beverages and Tobacco 2.1 55.5 0 9.1 13 33.4 
Food 12.3 54.6 1.6 9.4 13.5 30.1 
Electronic Devices & Semi-Conductors 0.6 52.1 0 8.3 24 19.8 
Oil and Coal Products 0.5 49.4 16.1 0 1.2 32.1 
Other Manufacturing 4.6 47.8 0.7 4.9 9.8 32.4 
Porcelain and Pottery 1.3 42.9 6.1 18.1 6.1 12.6 
Household Machinery 0.8 39.7 0 8.4 6.1 25.2 
Iron and Steel 1.3 35.4 0 16.5 2.8 16.1 
Newspapers 0.6 23.5 0 7.8 2 13.7 
1 Where ‘All Damage’ is the sum of pink, red, orange and yellow. 
 
 
Table 2. Average Change in Labor Productivity 1992-2007 for New, Dying and Continuing 
Plants. 
  
 Change 
New Plants  54.7% 
Dying Plants -39.5% 
Continuing Plants -13.7% 
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Table 3. Decomposition analysis (Labor Productivity 1992-2007) 
Component DAMAGE 
(d=1,0) 
(1) 
20% damage 
(2) 
50% damage 
(3) 
75% damage 
TOTAL EXITS  0.22 0.21 0.21 
EXITS 1 (Damaged) 0.13 0.14 0.11 
EXITS 0 (Undamaged) 0.09 0.07 0.10 
     
TOTAL CONTINUING  -0.72 -0.62 -0.68 
CONTINUING 1 (Damaged) -0.23 -0.07 0.01 
CONTINUING 0 (Undamaged) -0.49 -0.55 -0.69 
     
TOTAL ENTRANTS  1.5 1.42 1.47 
ENTRANTS 1 (Damaged) 0.58 0.58 0.60 
ENTRANTS 0 (Undamaged) 0.92 0.84 0.87 
     
 Number of observations = 19,221 
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Table 4. Main Results of Survival Analysis (Cox proportional hazard) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DISTEPI 1.01***       
 (0.0016)       
SHAKE  1.002      
  (0.0067)      
SMOOTH 
 
    1.62*** 
(0.28) 
  
PlantDAM    1.61***  1.61*** 3.83*** 
    (0.19)  (0.19) (0.72) 
ChomeDAM   1.08   1.01 7.88*** 
   (0.18)   (0.17) (2.30) 
PlantDAM*Time       0.83*** 
       (0.027) 
ChomeDAM*Time       0.66*** 
       (0.031) 
AGE 0.9997** 0.995** 0.995** 0.995** 0.997** 0.997** 0.997** 
 (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
SIZE2 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.52*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) 
SIZE3 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) 
SIZE4 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.86*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
WAGE 0.998*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.9997*** 0.998*** 0.998*** 
 (0.000046) (0.000046) (0.000046) (0.000047) (0.000047) (0.000047) (0.000048) 
TFP 0.89** 0.89** 0.89** 0.90*** 0.90** 0.90** 0.91* 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) 
MULTI 1.44*** 1.44*** 1.44*** 1.43*** 1.43*** 1.43*** 1.42*** 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
RECON 0.9993 1.0025 0.9998 0.995 0.9997 0.996 0.99 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
ClusterPlants 1.02** 1.03** 1.02** 1.03*** 1.03** 1.03** 1.03** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 16,658 16,658 16,658 16,658 16,658 16,658 16,658 
Wald 308594*** 318471*** 304152*** 338214*** 311356*** 323214*** 294578*** 
Each model contains controls for 3-digit industry, year, ward, age of buildings in a chome and type of buildings in a chome 
Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, * denote hazard ratios that are significantly different from 1 at 99%, 95% and 90% 
confidence levels, respectively  
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Table 5. Survival Analysis Sensitivity Results 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
PlantDAM 0.19** 1.83***    
 (0.09) (0.32)    
PlantDAM*Time -0.019 
(0.016) 
0.93** 
(0.028) 
   
PlantDAMpink   1.50** 3.05*** 3.26*** 
   (0.26) (0.96) (1.13) 
PlantDAMred   1.36** 3.98*** 3.63*** 
   (0.13) (0.72) (0.73) 
PlantDAMorange   1.11 2.41*** 1.90*** 
   (0.10) (0.48) (0.38) 
PlantDAMyellow   0.94 2.33*** 2.09*** 
   (0.075) (0.42) (0.37) 
PlantDAMpink*Time    0.90** 0.88** 
    (0.048) (0.047) 
PlantDAMred*Time    0.84*** 0.85*** 
    (0.023) (0.024) 
PlantDAMorange*Time    0.89*** 0.92*** 
    (0.025) (0.025) 
PlantDAMyellow*Time    0.87*** 0.88*** 
    (0.021) (0.02) 
ChomeDAMPink     1.95 
     (0.78) 
ChomeDAMRed     2.36*** 
     (0.75) 
ChomeDAMOrange     3.56*** 
     (1.28) 
ChomeDAMYellow     2.83*** 
     (0.91) 
ChomeDAMPink*Time     0.86** 
     (0.047) 
ChomeDAMRed*Time     0.81*** 
     (0.037) 
ChomeDAMOrange*Time     0.83*** 
     (0.043) 
ChomeDAMYellow*Time     0.80*** 
     (0.036) 
ChomeDAM 0.27** 2.55*** 1.01 7.95***  
 (0.11) (0.56) (0.17) (2.51)  
ChomeDAM*Time -0.057*** 0.82***  0.66***  
 (0.015) (0.025)  (0.031)  
θ  1.01e-7    
(p value)  (0.47)    
Observations 16,658 16,658 16,658 16,658 16,658 
In addition to the firm control variables contained in Table 3, each model contains industry, year, ward dummies and the age 
of buildings in chome and type of buildings in chome. Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, * denote hazard ratios 
that are significantly different from 1 (or coefficients significantly different from 0 in he case of model1) at 99%, 95% and 
90% confidence levels, respectively. Model 1 uses a Probit estimation; model 2 uses a parametric (exponential distribution) 
shared frailty model; model 3 uses a Cox proportional hazards model and separates plant-level damages into 4 individual 
categories; model 4 does the same and includes time interactions; model 5 uses a Cox proportional hazards model and 
separates both plant-level damage and chome damage into 4 individual categories with time interactions. 
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Table 6. Plant Damage Hazard Ratios for Unproductive, Small, Young and Low-Skill Plants. 
 FULL 
SAMPLE 
Least 
Productive 
(TFP) 
Least 
Productive 
(Lab Prod) 
Smallest Youngest Low-Skill 
PlantDAM 3.83*** 
(0.72) 
5.68*** 
(2.16) 
5.01*** 
(2.01) 
8.02*** 
(2.97) 
3.41*** 
(2.14) 
8.29*** 
(1.98) 
PlantDAM*Time 0.83*** 
(0.027) 
0.74*** 
(0.057) 
0.80*** 
(0.05) 
0.77*** 
(0.055) 
0.83*** 
(0.054) 
0.71*** 
(0.055) 
LR Test 
(p value) 
 12.27 
(0.007) 
12.21 
(0.007) 
15.91 
(0.001) 
4.46 
(0.22) 
23.15 
(0.000) 
Observations 16,658 4164 4164 4164 4164 4164 
Each model contains controls for 3-digit industry, year, ward, age of buildings in a chome and type of buildings in a 
chome and all of the other control variables reported in Table 3, column 7. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, * denote hazard ratios that are significantly different from 1 at 99%, 
95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively  
Where unproductive, small, young and low-skill plants refer to the lowest quartile of plants in terms of TFP, labor 
productivity, size, age and skill-level (wage) 
 
 
Table 7. Determinants of TFP and Labor Productivity 1992-2007 (fixed effects panel)  
 1 2 3 4 
 TFP TFP logLabProd logLabProd 
PlantDAM 0.022 
(0.025) 
0.10*** 
(0.027) 
0.017 
(0.023) 
0.093** 
(0.035) 
PlantDAM*Time  -0.0012*** 
(0.0024) 
 -0.011*** 
(0.0035) 
ChomeDAM 0.0042 
(0.022) 
-0.0090 
(0.023) 
0.039 
(0.030) 
-0.039** 
(0.020) 
ChomeDAM*Time  0.0018 
(0.0029) 
 0.011*** 
(0.0015) 
WAGE 0.0017*** 
(0.00011) 
0.0017*** 
(0.00011) 
0.0016*** 
(0.00013) 
0.0016*** 
(0.00013) 
MULTI -0.057*** 
(0.015) 
-0.058*** 
(0.015) 
-0.077*** 
(0.023) 
-0.077*** 
(0.022) 
RECON 0.074*** 
(0.010) 
0.074 
(0.010) 
0.045*** 
(0.012) 
0.044*** 
(0.012) 
ClusterPlants 0.00065* 
(0.00036) 
0.00064* 
(0.00036) 
0.00036 
(0.00029) 
0.00036 
(0.00028) 
observations 11,688 11,688 11,688 11,688 
R2 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.14 
Each model contains plant and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, * denote coefficients that are significantly 
different from 0 at 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively 
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Table 8. The Determinants of Plant Births 1993-2007 (negative binomial estimation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 1 2 3 4 
ChomeDAM -0.96*** -0.93***   
 (0.20) (0.23)   
ChomeDAM*Time  -0.0052   
  (0.020)   
ChomeDAMPink   -0.37 0.50 
   (0.34) (0.41) 
ChomeDAMRed   0.61** 1.43*** 
   (0.32) (0.39) 
ChomeDAMOrange   -1.37*** -1.66*** 
   (0.46) (0.58) 
ChomeDAMYellow   -0.74** -0.31*** 
   (0.33) (0.41) 
ChomeDAMPink*Time    -0.14*** 
    (0.041) 
ChomeDAMRed*Time    -0.12*** 
    (0.032) 
ChomeDAMOrange*Time    0.045 
    (0.056) 
ChomeDAMYellow*Time    -0.062 
    (0.038) 
RECON -1.34*** 
(0.17) 
-1.34*** 
(0.17) 
-1.25*** 
(0.28) 
-1.38*** 
(0.19) 
PLANTS -0.0048 -0.0047 -0.0046 -0.0052 
 (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0048) 
Time  -0.44*** 
(0.14) 
 -0.42*** 
(0.14) 
observations 10,440 10,440 10,440 10,440 
Wald 598.2*** 597.3*** 593.4*** 614.5*** 
Each model contains chome and year effects 
Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, **, * denote coefficients that are significantly different 
from 0 at 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variable Definitions1 
Variable  
DISTEPI Distance of plant to earthquake epicenter in kilometres. 
SHAKE 
Estimated peak ground velocity in centimetres per second estimated at the 
250m grid cell level by Fujimoto and Midorikawa (2002). 
SMOOTH 
A spatially smoothed measure of plant damage (average damage of plants 
within 100m excluding own building damage). 
PlantDAM Building-level damage index. 
ChomeDAM Chome-level Building damage index. 
AGE The age of the plant in years in 1995. 
SIZE (EMP) The total level of employment at the plant. 
SIZE1to SIZE4 Dummy variables =1 if a plant is in the first, second, third or fourth quartiles 
of total employment, respectively. 
WAGE The average annual wage per worker at the plant 10,000 Yen.  
TFP Total factor productivity, as defined in the online appendix. 
MULTI A dummy variable =1 if a plant is from a multi-plant firm. 
RECON 
 
A dummy variable =1 if a plant is located within one of 523 priority 
reconstruction districts in which reconstruction costs were subsidised and 
regulations were reduced. 
Births The number of new plants born within a chome. 
ClusterPlants The number of plants belonging to the same 2 digit industry as the plant in 
question and within the same chome. 
ClusterPlantsNb The number of plants belonging to the same 2 digit industry as the plant in 
question and within the same chome or neighboring chomes. 
ClusterEmp The level of employment within the same 2 digit industry as the plant in 
question and within the same chome. 
ClusterEmpNb The level of employment within the same 2 digit industry as the plant in 
question and within the same chome or neighboring chomes. 
VA The level of value added in 10,000 Yen. 
LabProd The level of value added per worker in 10,000 Yen. 
BUILDpre45 Share of buildings built pre 1945 by chome. 
BUILD46-55 Share of buildings built 1946-55 by chome. 
BUILD56-65 Share of buildings built 1956-65 by chome. 
BUILD66-75 Share of buildings built 1966-75 by chome. 
BUILD76-85 Share of buildings built 1976-85 by chome. 
BUILDafter86 Share of buildings built after 1986 by chome. 
BUILDbrick Share of brick built buildings by chome. 
BUILDrconc Share of reinforced concrete buildings by chome. 
BUILDsteel Share of steel buildings by chome. 
BUILDwood Share of wooden buildings by chome. 
1 All monetary variables are expressed in year 2000 prices. 
 
Variables SIZE, WAGE, MULTI, MOVE, VA and LabProd come from the Manufacturing Census (Japanese 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry).  Variable AGE is from the Establishment and Enterprise Census 
(Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications).  Our damage, building age and building type variables 
are from ‘Shinsai Hukkou Akaibu’ (archive on the damage of the 1995 Hyogo-Awaji earthquake) by Kobe City 
Office and Toru Fukushima (University of Hyogo), together with ‘Zenrin’s Residential Map, Hyogo-ken Kobe city 
1995’ from Toru Fukushima (University of Hyogo). 
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Table A2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DISTEPI 18.6 13.5 5.7 435.3 
SHAKE 79.3 6.4 32.3 93.0 
SMOOTH 0.20 0.19 0 0.75 
PlantDAM 0.22 0.27 0 0.75 
ChomeDAM 0.59 0.25 0.12 1 
AGE 18.1 15.0 1 42 
SIZE (EMP) 33.2 206.0 3 5673 
WAGE 355.9 174.4 67.8 1762.2 
TFP 4.40e-12 0.68 -6.9 3.5 
MULTI 0.14 0.33 0 1 
RECON 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Births 0.13 0.67 0 35 
ClusterPlants 1.5 3.0 0 20 
ClusterPlantsNb 5.1 8.5 0 88 
ClusterEmp 53.8 276.3 0 5687 
ClusterEmpNb 127.0 410.4 0 5712 
VA 69164.6 787135.5 1151.7 3.24e+07 
LabProd 954.4 1270.6 3.56 19085.6 
BUILDpre45 0.13 0.18 0 0.89 
BUILD46-55 0.058 0.071 0 0.46 
BUILD56-65 0.17 0.15 0 1 
BUILD66-75 0.29 0.19 0 1 
BUILD76-85 0.16 0.15 0 1 
BUILDafter86 0.18 0.19 0 1 
BUILDbrick 0.25 0.16 0 0.65 
BUILDrconc 0.22 0.15 0 0.64 
BUILDsteel 0.28 0.27 0 1 
BUILDwood 0.23 0.20 0 0.99 
Number of observations = 16,658 
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